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Central Bank Profit Distribution  
As A Monetary Policy Tool 
By MARTIN HIERMEYER* 
Next to conventional and unconventional monetary policy, 
there may be another form of monetary policy: Central bank 
profit distribution to the government. By distributing a higher 
profit than normal if inflation is below target, and a lower 
profit than normal if inflation is above target, central bankers 
may achieve their inflation target better. To guard against ex-
cessive inflation, lawmakers might stipulate that central 
bankers can only distribute higher profits than normal if con-
ventional monetary policy is exhausted (0% policy rate). 
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I. Introduction 
Conventional monetary policy can be defined as central bankers influ-
encing inflation through open market operations, the discount rate and/or 
reserve requirements. 
Unconventional monetary policy can be defined as central bankers influ-
encing inflation through credit easing, quantitative easing, forward guid-
ance, and/or signaling. Central banks generally only resort to unconven-
tional monetary policy if conventional monetary policy has run out of 
steam, i.e. if the central bank’s policy rate is already at 0% and inflation is 
still below target. 
Next to conventional and unconventional monetary policy, there may be 
another form of monetary policy: Central bank profit distribution to the 
government.  
As Bunea et al. (2016) have pointed out, central banks today distribute 
profits to their governments in line with a specific formula dictated by their 
legal framework. The formulas differ between central banks. For the period 
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2007-2013, Bunea et al. (2016) report that some central banks distributed 
a profit to their government even when the central bank experienced a net 
loss in the relevant year. Others, in contrast, distributed only a part of an 
annual net profit or even nothing at all. 
Bunea et al. (2016) suggest principles for a proper “central bank profit 
distribution policy”. One principle is that the policy should have a neutral 
impact on monetary policy. 
This paper questions this tenet and asks: Might central bank profit distri-
bution be a useful tool for monetary policy?  
II. Possible Disadvantages 
There are three possible disadvantages to using central bank profit distri-
bution as a tool for monetary policy: (1) A central bank that distributes 
higher profits than normal because inflation is below target engages in di-
rect government financing – an explosive endeavor that has caused hyper-
inflations in the past; (2.) A central bank that distributes higher than normal 
profits because inflation is below target may use up its capital quickly; (3.) 
A central bank that distributes higher (lower) profits than normal because 
inflation is below (above) target complicates the government’s budget pro-
cess.  
All three concerns deserve a closer look.  
A. Risk Of Hyperinflation 
Currently, central banks distribute profit according to a legal framework 
that does not include any reference to monetary policy or the inflation rate. 
Rather, the relevant legal framework reflects accounting standards and 
other conventions. 
It is generally assumed that a profit calculated in this way is a “fair” one, 
one which can be distributed to the government without constituting direct 
government financing – an endeavor explicitly outlawed in many countries. 
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If the normal profit is the “fair” profit, any add-on profit (distributed ad-
ditionally because inflation is below target) reflects direct government fi-
nancing.  
Direct government financing is a dangerous tool, one which has triggered 
many hyperinflations in the past. There are good arguments to not open this 
“Pandora’s box”. 
On the other hand, direct government financing is not unheard of, any-
way. For example, the Bank of England engages in direct government fi-
nancing right now. 
More importantly, with clear legal rules, the risk of excessive inflation 
may be containable. For example, lawmakers could legislate that the cen-
tral bank is only allowed to distribute higher-than-normal profits if inflation 
is below target and if conventional monetary policy is exhausted (policy 
rate of 0%). Furthermore, lawmakers could set a limit for the maximum 
profit that a central bank can distribute. 
B. Effect On Capital 
If a central bank distributes higher profits than normal, its capital be-
comes lower than normal. Capital might even turn negative.  
While central banks can operate with negative capital, negative capital 
may be a concern to the public (Stella 1997, 2002, 2003, Bindseil et al. 
2004). Such concern may be more pronounced if it takes long for capital to 
recover (for example because it is only after many years that an above-
target inflation rate forces the central bank to distribute lower-than-normal 
profits, rebuilding capital).  
While such concerns should not be taken lightly, it must be seen that the 
distribution of higher profits than normal may happen in a situation where 
inflation is below target and conventional monetary policy is exhausted 
(0% policy rate). In such a situation, the policy may replace quantitative 
easing, a policy which also concerns the public given the associated ex-
ploding size of central bank balance sheets. 
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Also, it must be seen that the central bank could choose to build up a 
capital buffer during times of above-target-inflation by combining a rela-
tively loose conventional monetary policy with a zero-profit-distribution 
policy. 
C. Effect On The Government’s Budget Process 
The more complex the formula for the central bank’s profit distribution, 
the less predictable the central bank’s profit distribution and the harder the 
budget process for the government. 
However: Budget processes are designed to handle some uncertainty. For 
example, tax revenue – a much bigger item in the budget process – is also 
highly uncertain. 
III. Possible Advantages 
There are three possible advantages to using central bank profit distribu-
tion as a tool for monetary policy: (1) Distributing higher central bank prof-
its than normal may stimulate inflation when conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy fail to do so; (2) Distributing higher profits than 
normal may make quantitative easing redundant – the central bank does not 
have to load up its balance sheets with bonds, a considerable advantage not 
only for monetary unions; (3) The central bank’s profit acts as an automatic 
fiscal stabilizer if the central bank distributes a higher (lower) profit if in-
flation is below (above) target. 
A. Powerful When Everything Else Fails 
The last decade has shown that inflation can be persistently low for long, 
and that conventional monetary policy may run out of steam soon. 
The cure of choice – quantitative easing – seems to have done well so 
far, although it is unclear whether even more unfavorable circumstances 
could have brought quantitative easing to its limits, too. In particular, the 
Japanese experience shows how tedious quantitative easing can be at times. 
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There can be little doubt that central bank profit distribution would be 
infinitely more powerful than quantitative easing as a monetary policy tool. 
As discussed above, it reflects direct government financing, which can trig-
ger hyperinflations if one is not careful as there is little limit to how much 
money central banks can print, and to how much money governments are 
willing to spend if unconstrained.  
However, given the right dosage, central bank profit distribution might 
just be what is needed to reflate a economy sometimes. 
B. Less Bonds On Central Bank Balance Sheets 
If central bank profit distribution replaces quantitative easing as a policy 
tool, central banks are spared the need to buy large quantities of govern-
ment and/or of commercial bonds. This is advantageous as such purchases 
distort markets and endanger financial stability. Also, government bonds 
are generally part of the mix in quantitative easing, which can be a problem 
for monetary unions. After all, if the central bank, for a lack of union-level 
bonds, buys bonds of member states, an unwanted joint liability may arise.  
C. Automatic Fiscal Stabilizer 
With central bank profit distribution as a tool for monetary policy, the 
central bank’s profit acts as an automatic stabilizer: The central bank dis-
tributes a higher profit than normal to the government when inflation is 
below target (and the economy could do with some fiscal stimulus), and a 
lower profit than normal when inflation is above target (and fiscal austerity 
is the order of the day). 
IV. Conclusion 
Using a central bank’s profit distribution to the government as a mone-
tary policy tool is not something which should be done lightly. After all, it 
opens the door for direct government financing – a dangerous tool, histor-
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ically responsibly for many costly hyperinflations. With those hyperinfla-
tions in mind, lawmakers in many countries have since outlawed direct 
government financing. 
When those laws were made, inflation, not deflation, was the main issue. 
Thus, little thought then had to be spent on how to reflate a notorious low-
inflation economy. 
 The last decade has shown that notoriously low inflation or deflation can 
be a tricky issue, too, and even quantitative easing might not suffice as a 
policy response.  
This paper therefore carefully weighed the pros and cons of one specific 
form of direct government financing – central bank profit distribution to 
the government as a tool of monetary policy. 
It is the opinion of the author that with the right safeguards, central bank 
profit distribution is an option to reflate notorious low-inflation economies 
if conventional monetary policy has failed to do so.  
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